Walter Parchomenko
June, 15

More than two months after Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, it is no surprise that the government is in a state of deep paralysis, which will not necessarily end with the appointment of a new prime minister. The brief “timeout” called for by President Viktor Yushchenko in the wake of last March’s parliamentary elections, purportedly to develop a much needed coalition program that would spell out goals and responsibilities for Orange coalition members for the next five years, has now dragged on interminably, sorely testing even the patience of a saint, but more importantly, of a nation that lives mostly on the brink of poverty.

The real reason for the president’s timeout seems to be the widely acknowledged fact that the impressive victory of Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYuT bloc in last March’s parliamentary elections caught the president and his close advisors totally by surprise. With no game plan for the day after at hand, they resorted to a timeout, a policy option that is quickly becoming a hallmark of this presidential administration. Critics of the timeout charge that the urgently needed Orange Coalition program already exists but simply isn’t being implemented, and that the president and his close advisors are devoting all of their energies during this period primarily to devise ways to keep Tymoshenko from becoming prime minister, or at least to develop mechanisms within a new coalition agreement that will restrict her considerable powers. Apparently, the president fears that he will be left with no significant powers if Tymoshenko becomes prime minister.

It is not at all surprising that President Yushchenko would like more powers, not fewer. However, it is ironic that he chooses not to use his existing powers to intervene authoritatively to end the protracted stalemate over the formation of an Orange coalition, as repeatedly requested by former Maidan allies. Instead, he chooses to play a tepid and largely ceremonial role in these excruciatingly protracted negotiations. Meanwhile, the country’s hopper of problems is overflowing, making the job of any new prime minister more difficult with each passing day. Economic and political protests are increasing on the streets of Ukraine, while the central government remains essentially paralyzed.

Yulia Tymoshenko, on the other hand, ambitiously seeks power, but only as a means to promote the end of building a rule-of-law state that protects the rights of ordinary citizens and foreign investors alike. To think otherwise is a grave misconception. She is not driven by an insatiable appetite for power, as some critics charge.

Not surprisingly, much of the media coverage of Tymoshenko is extremely biased and either very pro– or anti-Tymoshenko. However, beyond the popular images of her as a warrior princess, a Slavic Joan of Arc, the last Samurai, a gas princess, the locomotive of the Orange Revolution, and a fiery femme fatale, there is a more complex reality which is only dimly perceived here and abroad.

The crucial question for Ukraine today is: How can we better understand Yulia Tymoshenko’s potential to help lead the country out of troubled economic and political waters?

The relevant, theoretical literature of Western political science provides some useful criteria for tackling this question. It suggests that a more informed basis for speculation may be attained by assessing a leader’s capability for learning, rejuvenation and change.

What do we see when we place Tymoshenko’s relevant record under the magnifying glass of critical analysis?

It is often said that it is important to learn from one’s mistakes, but better still to learn from those made by others. Tymoshenko is quick to acknowledge mistakes she has made and to accept blame, and quicker still to ensure that they will not be repeated again. As prime minister under Yushchenko during 2005, her economic program, especially its re-privatization and social spending policies, caused considerable anxiety among potential Western investors. Tymoshenko claims she was greatly misunderstood. During the past six months, she has made numerous appearances before foreign audiences, including the British-Ukrainian and American-Ukrainian chambers of commerce, to set the record straight and to stress that she seeks to create a business-friendly environment in which any re-privatizations that may occur will be very limited and strictly a matter for Ukraine’s criminal courts. In general, Tymoshenko emphasizes that she will strive to create a predictable, rule of law environment for foreign investors and Ukrainian citizens alike.

Furthermore, Tymoshenko has made it clear that as premier in a new government she will demand that all the ministers in her Cabinet actively support the Orange coalition’s reform program, so as not to repeat her difficult experience as premier during 2005. She has also vowed never to repeat the strategic mistake made by Yushchenko when he compromised Maidan principles by joining forces last November with his rival and opponent in the last presidential elections, Viktor Yanukovych, in return for his party’s support for Yushchenko’s candidate for prime minister, Yuriy Yekhanurov.

Regarding Tymoshenko’s capability for rejuvenation, many Ukraine watchers believed that her political star had been eclipsed when Yushchenko sacked her as premier last September. In an interview with Ukraine’s Tonis TV channel last March, she candidly admitted that dark, difficult days followed her dismissal, but stated that she never lost hope, was soon “politically reanimated,” and remained an “incurable optimist” simply because there is no better alternative.

In the months that followed, Tymoshenko also amazingly rejuvenated her political bloc, giving it a major facelift, which included thoughtful, positive imagery. She subsequently organized and executed a brilliant election campaign that did not resort to the dirty tricks and black PR of other parties, but instead projected the positive, heartfelt message, “justice is worth fighting for.” Over the course of the next few months, she made more than 400 appearances in town squares and meeting halls across the country before an estimated total of 4 million people, according to her website. President Yushchenko, meanwhile, watched his Our Ukraine bloc splinter into several other parties and saw public support for his bloc steadily erode.

Significantly, Tymoshenko also did not lose hope and was not defeated in Februrary 2001 when President Leonid Kuchma, using alleged business crimes as a pretext, had her arrested and jailed because of her fierce opposition to his corrupt regime. She did not allow her spirit to be broken during her several weeks of confinement and subsequently returned to politics more determined than ever to rid the country of its entrenched, corrupt government and Kuchma, in particular.

As for Tymoshenko’s capability for change, she is flexible but principled. Unlike President Yushchenko, she categorically refuses to ever enter into any coalition with Yanukovych and his Regions Party, but continues to extend an olive branch to the president, despite some sharp political differences. A firm supporter of European integration, she also takes a pragmatic position on the issue of NATO, calling for a national referendum as an essential requirement for membership in the alliance.

With respect to the president’s capability to change, most conspicuous is his deep-seated inability to develop a genuine partnership with his once close Orange ally, Yuliya Tymoshenko.  Moreover, there is the president’s unfortunate inability to break relations with discredited key members of his inner circle, notably Roman Zwarych and Petro Poroshenko.

Viewed in this light, several conclusions are inescapable.

First of all, the seemingly endless dispute over the formation of an Orange Coalition is more about the struggle for power and the division of key posts in the new government and parliament than about the need to craft yet another massive Orange-team document. Here in Ukraine one hears this view expressed daily in casual conversations with ordinary citizens, often punctuated with the exclamation: “Ukrainians aren’t stupid!  We know what they’re up to.”

Secondly, most political observers underestimate Tymoshenko’s capability to learn, rejuvenate and change, while overstating Yushchenko’s potential in these areas. Close scrutiny of Tymoshenko’s record reveals that she is a strategic thinker and planner who approaches problem-solving very systematically, and actively solicits competing interpretations from associates and independent experts when making important decisions. Conversely, the president’s style of leadership on domestic issues, including energy security, conspicuously lacks strategic orientation. With few notable exceptions, during the past year-and-a-half it has been reactive and marked by a firefighting, muddling through, timeout-invoking or even crisis-management style of leadership.

Finally, President Yushchenko should understand that more and more Ukrainians, including former fervent supporters, believe that he is putting his political ambitions and personal interests, in general, above the public interest. More and more Ukrainians with each passing day see him drifting further and further away from the real world of his own citizens. They see him nestled in the closed circle of his half-dozen or so most loyal team members, exposed to and embracing their groupthink, and connected tenuously to his citizenry mainly by his televised appearances at ceremonial functions and by his weekly radio message to the nation.

There is also a growing public perception here in Ukraine that the president is too busy wooing the West to act authoritatively and decisively at home; too busy to facilitate the formation of a new government that could begin to tackle the country’s mounting domestic problems.

Make no mistake, appointing Yuliya Tymoshenko prime minister in the new government will be no panacea for Ukraine’s many economic and political problems, notably its rampant corruption, energy insecurity, and long-delayed administrative and judicial reform. Countless political opponents can be expected to work actively to sabotage her reform efforts. Other individuals, including members of the Our Ukraine bloc, no doubt, will silently watch and hope that she stumbles.

But Tymoshenko, by her own admission, is keenly aware of the political minefield ahead and prepared more than ever for the fierce struggle ahead. Her exceptional capability to learn from past mistakes, rejuvenate and advance after serious setbacks, her ability to be flexible but principled in the face of changing times, and her brilliantly executed election campaign all strongly suggest that she is Ukraine’s best hope.

Walter Parchomenko, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council of the United States currently based in Ukraine.